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ABSTRACT
In this work, we take the first step towards understanding whether
the intrinsic randomness of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) can
be leveraged for privacy, for any given dataset and model. In doing
so, we hope to mitigate the trade-off between privacy and perfor-
mance for models trained with differential-privacy (DP) guarantees.
Our primary contribution is a large-scale empirical analysis of SGD
on convex and non-convex objectives. We evaluate the inherent
variability in SGD on 4 datasets and calculate the intrinsic data-
dependent ϵi (D) values due to the inherent noise. First, we show
that the variability in model parameters due to random sampling
almost always exceeds that due to changes in the data. We use this
to show that the existing theoretical bound on the sensitivity of
SGD with convex objectives is not tight. For logistic regression,
we observe that SGD provides intrinsic ϵi (D) values between 3.95
and 23.10 across four datasets, dropping to between 1.25 and 4.22
using the tight empirical sensitivity bound. For neural networks
considered, we report high ϵi (D) values (>40) owing to their larger
parameter count. Next, we propose a method to augment the in-
trinsic noise of SGD to achieve the desired target ϵ . Our augmented
SGD produces models that outperform existing approaches with
the same privacy target, closing the gap to noiseless utility between
0.03% and 36.31% for logistic regression. We further explore the role
of the number of steps of SGD, and demonstrate that our analysis
provides stable estimates. Our experiments provide concrete evi-
dence that changing the seed in SGD has a far greater impact on
the model’s weights than excluding any given training example. By
accounting for this intrinsic randomness - subject to necessary as-
sumptions, we can achieve a consistent and statistically significant
improvement in utility, without sacrificing further privacy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Respecting the privacy of people contributing their data to train
machine learning models is important for the safe use of this tech-
nology [15, 41, 46]. Private variants of learning algorithms have
been proposed to address this need [7, 16, 38, 44, 48]. Unfortunately
the utility of private models is typically degraded, limiting their ap-
plicability. This performance loss often results from the need to add
noise during or after model training, to provide the strong protec-
tions of ϵ-differential-privacy [12]. However, results to date neglect
the fact that learning algorithms are often stochastic. Framing them
as ‘fixed’ queries on a dataset neglects an important source of intrin-
sic noise. Meanwhile, the randomness in learning algorithms such
as stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is well-known among machine
learning practitioners [14, 19], and has been lauded for affording
superior generalisation to its non-stochastic counterpart [24]. More-
over, the ‘insensitive’ nature of SGD relative to variations in its
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Figure 1: A demonstration of the variability of SGDdue to its
random seed, on a fixed dataset. Each curve shows the evolu-
tion model weights w26 and w36 throughout training, using
runs of SGD on the same data with identical initialisation,
with different random seeds and thus data sampling order.
The model is logistic regression on the Forest dataset.
input data has been established in terms of uniform stability [18].
The data-dependent nature of this stability has also been charac-
terised [27]. Combining these observations, we speculate that the
variability in the model parameters produced by the stochasticity
of SGD may exceed its sensitivity to perturbations in the specific
input data, affording ‘data-dependent intrinsic’ privacy. In essence,
we ask: “Can the intrinsic, data-dependent stochasticity of SGD help
with the privacy-utility trade-off?”
Our Approach. We consider a scenario where a model is trained
securely, but the final model parameters are released to the public
- for example, a hospital which trains a prediction model on its
own patient data and then shares it with other hospitals or a cloud
provider. We therefore focus on how SGD introduces randomness in
the final weights of a trained model. This randomness is introduced
from two main sources — (1) random initialization of the model
parameters and (2) random sampling of the input dataset during
training. We highlight that training a model on the same data, even
with the same initialisation produces different final weights, purely
due to the random order of traversal for that given dataset (shown
in Figure 1). We argue that rather than viewing this variability
as a pitfall of stochastic optimisation, it can instead be seen as a
source of noise that can mask information about participants in the
training data. This prompts us to investigate whether SGD itself
can be viewed as a differentially-private mechanism, with some
intrinsic data-dependent ϵ-value, which we refer to as ϵi (D). To
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calculate ϵi (D), we propose a novel method that characterises SGD
as a Gaussian mechanism and estimates the intrinsic randomness
for a given dataset, using a large-scale empirical approach. To the
best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to report the empiri-
cal calculation of ϵi (D) values based on the observed distribution.
Finally, we propose an augmented differentially-private SGD algo-
rithm that takes into account the intrinsic ϵi (D) to provide better
utility. We empirically compute the ϵi (D) for SGD and the utility
improvement for models trained with both convex and non-convex
objectives on 4 different datasets: MNIST, CIFAR10, Forest Cover-
type and Adult. We also explore the impact of data preprocessing,
the number of steps of SGD, and demonstrate that our empirical
estimates are stable.
Contributions. We summarize our contributions below:
• Variability in SGD: We empirically show that on both convex
and non-convex objectives the variability due to randomness
in SGD for our benchmark datasets almost always exceeds the
sensitivity due to changes in the data. This effect is magnified
when both model initialisation and dataset traversal order are
allowed to vary. This variability also exceeds existing theoretical
upper bounds on the sensitivity for convex objectives, motivating
further research into data-dependent sensitivity bounds.
• Computing data-dependent intrinsic ϵi (D) values: We propose a
first concrete technique to compute the data-dependent intrinsic
ϵi (D) values from the output distribution of model parameters
trained using SGD. These ϵi (D) values range from 3.95 to 23.10
(1.25 to 4.22 with an empirical sensitivity estimate) for convex
objectives, indicating that randomness in SGD does contribute
toward privacy for some tasks similar to that achieved with dedi-
cated private learning algorithms [23]. For non-convex objectives
we consider higher-dimensional neural network models, which
exhibit much higher ϵi (D) values and therefore do not enjoy
appreciable utility benefits. We further characterise the distribu-
tion of ‘pairwise’ ϵi (D) values, computed using local sensitivity
estimates.
• Utility Evaluation: We empirically evaluate and compare the
utility of private, low-dimensional models with and without
accounting for the intrinsic variability in SGD. We focus on
ϵ,δ -differential privacy with ϵ = 1 and δ = 1/N 2 with N as
training data size. We find a statistically significant improvement
across all datasets considered, closing the gap to the accuracy of
a noiseless model by up to 6.46%. This improvement increases to
between 2.54% and 36.31% when the (tight) empirical sensitivity
bound is used.
2 PROBLEM & BACKGROUND
We study the variability due to random sampling, and sensitivity
to dataset perturbations of stochastic gradient descent (SGD). We
relate these to the privacy properties of SGD and demonstrate that
this variability can be used to improve the utility of private models.
2.1 Preliminaries
As we focus on (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy, we provide a brief outline
below, as well as an overview of the SGD algorithm.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy hides the participation
of an individual sample in the dataset [12]. Informally, it ensures
that the presence or absence of a single data point in the input
dataset does not appreciably change the output of a differentially
private query on that dataset. It is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 ( (ϵ,δ )-Differential Privacy). AmechanismM with
domain I and range O satisfies (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy if for any
two neighbouring datasets S, S ′ ∈ I that differ only in one input
and for a set E ⊆ O, we have: Pr(M(S) ∈ E) ≤ eϵ Pr(M(S ′) ∈ E)+δ
(ϵ,δ )-differential privacy ensures that for all adjacent datasets S
and S ′, the privacy loss of any individual datapoint is bounded by ϵ
with probability at least 1−δ [13]. A well established method to de-
sign ϵ-differentially private mechanism is to add noise proportional
to the ℓ1 or ℓ2 sensitivity of the algorithm’s output to a change in a
single input sample. We consider an algorithm whose output is the
weights of a trained model, thus focus on the ℓ2-sensitivity:
Definition 2.2 (ℓ2-Sensitivity (FromDef 3.8 in [13]). Let f be a func-
tion that maps a dataset to a vector in Rd . Let S , S ′ be two datasets
such that they differ in one data point. Then the ℓ2-sensitivity of a
function f is defined as: ∆2(f ) = maxS,S ′ ∥ f (S) − f (S ′)∥2
One such method for making a deterministic query f differen-
tially private is the Gaussian mechanism:
Theorem 2.3. From [13] Let f be a function that maps a dataset
to a vector in Rd . Let ϵ ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. For c2 > 2 ln (1.25/δ ),
adding Gaussian noise sampled using the parameters σ ≥ c∆2(f )/ϵ
guarantees (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy.
This gives a way to compute the ϵ of a Gaussian-distributed
query given δ , its sensitivity ∆2(f ), and its variance σ 2.
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). SGD and its derivatives are
the most common optimisation methods for training machine learn-
ing models [4]. Given a loss function L(w, (x ,y)) averaged over
a dataset, SGD provides a stochastic approximation of the tra-
ditional gradient descent method by estimating the gradient of
L at random inputs. At step t , on selecting a random sample
(xt ,yt ) the gradient update function G performs wt+1 = G(wt ) =
wt − η∇wL(wt , (x ,y)), where η is the (constant) step-size or learn-
ing rate, andwt are the weights of the model at t . In practice, the
stochastic gradient is estimated using a mini-batch of B samples. We
consider the typical scenario where the dataset is shuffled in each
epoch, and batches are selected sequentially without replacement.
This approach provides better convergence properties [21, 40], how-
ever we expect other variants to share the variability we study.
Recently, Wu et al. [48] showed results for the sensitivity of SGD
to the change in a single training example for a convex, L-Lipschitz
and β-smooth loss L. We use this sensitivity bound in our analyses
to compute intrinsic ϵi (D) for convex functions.
Let A denote the SGD algorithm using r as the random seed. The
upper bound for sensitivity for k-passes of SGD with learning rate
η is given by
∆ˆS = maxr ∥A(r ; S) −A(r ; S
′)∥ ≤ 2kLη (1)
∆ˆS gives the maximum difference in the model parameters due to
the presence or absence of a single input sample. When trained
2
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using a batch size of B, the sensitivity bound can be reduced by
a factor of B i.e., ∆ˆS ≤ 2kLη/B. We provide detailed explanation
for this sensitivity and variability of SGD in Appendix A.1 and
A.2. Throughout the paper, the theoretical sensitivity always refers
to the one with batch size B. We use this theoretical sensitivity
in addition to empirically-computed sensitivity estimates in our
experiments to compute the ϵi (D) for models trained using convex
loss functions. For the non-convex models, no known theoretical
sensitivity is established and hencewe use only empirical sensitivity
values to compute ϵi (D) values.
We can intuitively motivate why the random seed may have
a larger impact than changes to the data samples by observing
that two models trained with different random seeds will have
differing examples in almost every batch. For optima with multiple
minima, this poses an opportunity for SGD to widely explore the
parameter space, potentially drowning out sensitivity to individual
input samples.
2.2 Threat Model
In our threat model, SGD itself is the query that the adversary re-
quests on a private dataset and model parameters are the output
that it receives. That is, we assume the training with SGD happens
in-house and only the final model parameters are released. For
example, a hospital trains a model for disease detection using its
private patient records and uploads the model to a cloud provider
for other hospitals to benefit from it. Here, the cloud provider or
anyone with access to the model parameters is considered as an
adversary. The adversary therefore has access to the fully trained
model, including its architecture, and we assume details of the
training procedure are public (e.g. batch size, number of training
iterations, learning rate), but not the random seed used to initialise
the model parameters and sample inputs from the dataset. Thus,
we consider a powerful adversary that has white-box access to
the model. Prior research has shown several attacks such as mem-
bership inference and model inversion that can compromise the
privacy of the training dataset in this setting [15, 41]. We assume
that each individual contributes one sample, and that leaking even
this membership in the dataset poses a privacy risk to the user
contributing the sample. Our goal is to protect the privacy of the
training dataset such as the sensitive patient health records while
maintaining reasonable utility from the trained model.
Assuming the random seed is unknown to the adversary adds
noise to the output of SGD, which may add plausible deniability,
and thus privacy to dataset participants. While seed-dependent
results pose a reproducibility and reliability challenge, we argue
that this randomness is helpful for ensuring privacy. We limit our
scope to only seed-dependent randomness and do not consider
variabilitity introduced by hiding other hyperparameters such as
batchsize and learning rate.
2.3 Research Questions
We formulate our problem with the following questions:
1. Does the variability in SGD exceed the sensitivity due
to changes in an individual input sample?
To answer this, we present a large-scale empirical study in Sec-
tion 6.1 across several diverse datasets.We build on results fromHardt
et al. [18] and Wu et al. [48] that allow us to bound the (expected)
difference in the model parameters when trained with SGD using a
convex objective function. For non-convex objectives, we empiri-
cally compute the sensitivity due to changes in an input sample and
variability due to randomness for different combination of neigh-
bouring datasets.
2. Can we quantify the data-dependent intrinsic privacy of
SGD, if any?
To quantify the ‘data-dependent intrinsic privacy’ of SGD, we aim
to calculate the intrinsic ϵi (D) values for any given dataset. This
ϵi (D) estimate allows us to comment on the potential privacy af-
forded by SGD and compare across datasets. For this, we propose a
novel algorithm to calculate the ϵi (D) values for a model trained
using SGD (Section 3), under some assumptions. Essentially, we in-
terpret the posterior distribution returned by SGD computed with
many random seeds as a Gaussian distribution and estimate its
parameters using both theoretical (for convex loss) and empirical
sensitivity bounds. We then empirically compute ϵi (D) values for
our target datasets (Section 6.2).
3. Can the intrinsic privacy of SGD improve utility?
We question whether the intrinsic privacy can be leveraged to im-
prove the utility of privacy-preserving models trained with SGD.
We propose an augmented DP-SGD algorithm based on the output
perturbation technique [3, 7, 44, 48]. Section 4 gives the details
of this algorithm, and Section 6.3 gives the evaluation for utility
improvements.
3 ESTIMATING ϵI (D) FOR SGD
We think of SGD as a procedure for sampling model weights from
some distribution, and aim to understand the parameters of this
distribution to characterise its intrinsic privacy with respect to
a dataset it is run on. While theoretically characterising SGD as
a sampling mechanism is a subject of ongoing research [29], in
this section, we propose an algorithm for empirically estimating
the potential privacy properties of SGD. We outline and motivate
the steps of the algorithm in what follows, and summarize the
procedure in Algorithm 1.
Computing ϵi (D). We aim to compute what we call the ‘data-
dependent intrinsic’ ϵ of SGD - ϵi (D).1 To do this, we start by
assuming that the noise of SGD is normally distributed. This is
a common albeit restrictive assumption [29, 43]. We empirically
test the assumption across our datasets in Section 7.4 and do not
find it to be strongly violated, however we consider weakening this
assumption an important future step.
If A is the SGD algorithm, and S is a training dataset of size N
(for example, MNIST), we therefore assume A(S) = w¯S +wρ , where
w¯S is deterministic and dataset-dependent andwρ ∼ N(0, Iσi (D)2)
is the intrinsic random noise induced by the stochasticity of SGD.
Based on Theorem 2.3 in Section 2.1, we then characterize SGD
as a Gaussian mechanism with parameters c2 > 2 ln (1.25/δ ) and
σi (D) ≥ c∆2(f )/ϵi (D). The value of δ is arbitrary, but we set it to
δ = 1/N 2 following convention [13].
1Although the notation does not capture it, we assume an implicit model-dependence
of ϵi (D) throughout.
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Algorithm 1 Estimating ϵi empirically
1: Given neighbouring datasets S = {Sa } |S |a , random seeds R = {ri }Ri ,
SGD algorithm A with batch size B , fixed learning rate η, number of
epochs k , δ , Lipschitz constant L.
2: for all Sa ∈ S do
3: for all r ∈ R do
4: wr ,a ← A(Sa ; r ) ▷ Run SGD on Sa with seed r
5: procedure Compute sensitivity
6: for r ∈ R do
7: for Sa, Sb ∈ S do
8: ∆rabS ← ∥wr ,a −wr ,b ∥ ▷ Pairwise sensitivity
9: ∆ˆS ← 2kLη/B ▷ Theoretical bound
10: ∆ˆ∗S ← maxr ,a,b ∆rabS ▷ Empirical bound
11: procedure Compute variance
12: for all Sa ∈ S do
13: w¯a ← 1R
∑
r wr ,a
14: σa ← stddev
(
flatten
(
wr ,a − w¯a
) )
15: σi ← min|S |a σa
16: procedure Compute epsilon
17: c ← √2log(1.25)/δ + 1 × 10−5
18: ϵi ← c ∆ˆS /σi ▷ Get values for Sensitivity & Variance
19: ϵ ∗i ← c ∆ˆ∗S /σi ▷ Using empirical bound
return ϵi , ϵ ∗i
Assuming we know σi (D), δ , and ∆2(f ), we calculate ϵi (D) as:
ϵi (D) =
√
2 log 1.25/δ∆2(f )
σi (D) (2)
For ϵi (D) > 1, Theorem 2.3 does not hold. In this case we interpret
ϵi (D) as a way to capture the relationship between the sensitivity
∆2(f ) and variability σi (D) of SGD on a given dataset given δ .
Computing Sensitivity. As per definition 2.2, the sensitivity of
SGD is given by the largest ℓ2-norm change in model weights
obtained from neighbouring datasets. We can empirically compute
(an estimate of) this value for both convex and non-convex models.
Details of the set-up of this empirical study are provided in Section 5.
First, we can compute a ‘pairwise’ sensitivity between models
trained with the same seed (r ) on neighbouring datasets (Si , Sj ):
∆
r i j
S = ∥A(Si , r ) −A(Sj , r )∥ (3)
Taking the maximum of ∆r i jS we obtain the ‘global’ (dataset-
specific) sensitivity, which we estimate empirically using a subset
of i, j, r , as ∆ˆ∗S :
∆ˆ∗S = maxi, j,r ∥A(Si , r ) −A(Sj , r )∥ (4)
We assume we have access to a public dataset from which this value
can be estimated.
If we consider the pairwise sensitivity, we obtain a distribution
of ϵi (D) values which would be obtained by considering subsets
of permissible neighbouring datasets. This variant of sensitivity
computation is similar to the notion of smooth sensitivity for a
given dataset instance which is emerging as a promising approach
for designing better differentially-private mechanisms [32].
Lastly, for convex models, we can also take the (bound on the)
theoretical sensitivity of SGD ∆ˆS estimated by Hardt et al. [18], Wu
et al. [48] and described in Section 2.1. There is no corresponding
theoretical sensitivity bound for the non-convexmodels. We discuss
the implication of these sensitivity values (∆ˆ∗S ,∆
r i j
S , ∆ˆS ) in our
evaluation.
Computing Variance. For computing variance, the object of cen-
tral interest is σi (D), which is the (assumed diagonal) covariance
ofwρ - the ‘noise’ added to the final weights by the stochasticity in
SGD. We can obtain samples of wρ by running SGD with different
random seeds and subtracting the data-dependent mean value w¯S .
Estimating σi (D) then amounts to computing the standard devia-
tion of the (flattened) estimated wρ .2 In practice, a separate σi (D)
can be estimated for each dataset S , and we take the minimum
observed value, although we find it to be broadly independent of
S (see Section 7.4). As for ∆ˆ∗S , we assume for the purpose of this
work that the user has access to a public dataset whose distribution
is sufficiently similar to the private dataset, such that σi (D) can be
estimated. This is similar to the setting of fine-tuning in Wu et al.
[48], where the private dataset is used predominantly to fine-tune
a model already trained on a similar, but public dataset.
4 AUGMENTED DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE
SGD
In this section, we show how to account for the data-dependent
intrinsic noise of SGDwhile adding noise using the output perturba-
tion method that ensures differential privacy guarantees [48]. The
basic premise of output perturbation techniques is to train a model
in secret, and then release a noisy version of the final weights. For
a desired ϵ , δ , and a known sensitivity value (∆ˆS , ∆ˆ∗S ) the Gaussian
mechanism (Theorem 2.3) gives us the required level of noise that
needs to be present in the output, which we call σtarget. In Wu et al.
[48], this σtarget defines the variance of the noise vector sampled
and added to the model weights, to produce a (ϵ,δ )-DP model. In
our case, we reduce σtarget to account for the noise already present
in the output of SGD. Since the sum of two independent Gaussians
with variance σ 2a and σ 2b is a Gaussian with variance σ
2
a + σ
2
b , if the
intrinsic noise of SGD is σi (D), to achieve the desired ϵ we need
to augment σi (D) to reach σtarget:
σaugment =
√
σ 2target − σi (D)2 (5)
If σi already exceeds the required σtarget, no additional noise is
required. Given the likely degradation of model performance with
output noise, accounting for σi (D) is expected to help utility with-
out compromising privacy. The resulting algorithm for augmented
differentially-private SGD is shown in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4.1. Assuming SGD is a Gaussian mechanism with in-
trinsic noise σi (D), Algorithm 2 is (ϵ,δ )-differentially private.
The proof is a straight-forward application of the fact that the
sum of Gaussians is a Gaussian, and so the construction in Algo-
rithm 2 produces the desired value ofσ to achieve a (ϵ,δ )-differentially
private mechanism as per Theorem 2.3.
2We found that other choices for estimating an aggregate σi (D), such as computing
a per-weight σi (D)k and then averaging, or estimating the variance of the norm of
the weights, produced largely consistent results. It is likely that a superior method for
estimating σi (D) exists, which we leave as a question for future work.
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Algorithm 2 Augmented differentially private SGD
1: Given σi (D), ϵtarget, δ , ∆2(f ), model weights wprivate.
2: c ← √2log(1.25)/δ + 1 × 10−5
3: σtarget ← c∆2(f )/ϵtarget
4: if σi (D) < σtarget then
5: σaugment ←
√
σ 2target − σi (D)2
6: else
7: σaugment ← 0
8: ρ ∼ N(0, σaugment)
9: wpublic ← wprivate + ρ
return wpublic
5 EMPIRICAL STUDY
To better understand both sensitivity and variability of SGD, we
conduct an extensive empirical study. Our broad objective is to
understand and quantify the variability in the weights of a trained
model, and to relate this variability to the data-dependent intrinsic
privacy of the algorithm. Our evaluation goals are three-fold:
(1) Quantify and compare the variability of SGD arising from
changes in data and/or random seed
(2) Compute the intrinsic ϵi (D) of SGD that quantifies how much
privacy the stochasticity of SGD provides to this dataset
(3) Evaluate the utility of a private model accounting for this in-
trinsic noise in SGD
5.1 Experimental design
At a high level, we run a grid of experiments where we aim to vary
data or (non-exclusively) the random seed. We use variations of
the random seed to explore the intrinsic randomness in SGD, and
variations of the data to explore sensitivity to dataset perturbations.
We describe these two variations in more detail in the following
sections.
5.1.1 Variation in Data. To vary the data, we consider ‘neigh-
bouring’ datasets derived from a given data source D (e.g. two
variants of MNIST). A pair of datasets is neighbouring if they differ
in exactly one example. Comparing models trained on neighbour-
ing datasets allow us to estimate the sensitivity of the training
algorithm for that dataset and hence giving us data-dependent
sensitivity values.
To construct a set of datasets which are all neighbours, we use
an approach similar to Hardt et al. [18]. We define a set of datasets
{Si } where Si is the original data source where its ith entry xi has
been replaced by (wlog) the first example x0. We then drop the first
example from the training data, as it appears again in some later
position. In this way, the derived datasets Si and Sj , differ in that
the former is missing xi , and latter is missing xj (each contains x0
in the ith and jth positions respectively). It is important to replace
the ‘missing’ entry to ensure that for a fixed seed (and thus order of
dataset traversal), the mini-batches sampled from Si and Sj differ
only when they would encounter the ith and jth elements.
It is possible that for a pair (Si , Sj ), the choice of x0 to replace the
missing elements may produce a lower apparent sensitivity than
finding the xk to maximise the distance between Si and Sj - this
Dataset Training size Validation size Test size d
CIFAR2 9,000 1,000 2,000 50*
MNIST-binary 10,397 1,155 1,902 50*
Adult 29,305 3,256 16,281 100
Forest 378,783 42,086 74,272 49
Table 1: Statistics for benchmark datasets. The dimension of
feature vectors is d . CIFAR2 and MNIST-binary are originally
(32, 32, 3) and (28, 28) respectively, but were projected to d =
50 using PCA.
is a limitation of the way we have designed this analysis, but it
significantly reduces the computational complexity.
5.1.2 Variation in Random Seed. To vary the random seed, we
simply run each experiment (on given dataset Si ) multiple times
with different seeds provided to the random number generator.
As machine learning frameworks are often quite high level, we
carefully ensured all relevant random number generators were ini-
tialised correctly and there were no further sources of randomness
in our experiments. The random seed impacts the training proce-
dure by impacting the initialisation of the weights, as well as the
order of traversal of the dataset. For illustration we also consider
a variant of this setting where the initialisation of the model is
fixed, corresponding to fine-tuning a public (albeit poor) model. We
follow the traditional setting of SGD where a random permutation
(determined by the random seed) is applied to the training data at
the start of each epoch, and batches of examples are sequentially
drawn without replacement.
5.2 Training and model details
5.2.1 Benchmark datasets. Primarily focusing on binary classifi-
cation tasks, we perform our experiments using four data sources:
• CIFAR2[26]: We convert the (32, 32, 3)-dimensional images in CI-
FAR10 to d = 50 using principal component analysis (PCA) [37],
and restrict to classes 0 and 2 (planes and birds) to form a binary
classification task (hence CIFAR2).
• MNIST-binary[28]: As with CIFAR2 we use 2 classes (3 and 5)
and project to d = 50 with PCA.
• Adult[11]3: The task is to predict whether an individual’s income
exceeds $50k/year based on census data from 1994. We one-hot
encode categorical-valued features, dropping the first level.
• Forest[9, 11]4: Forest cover type prediction from cartographic
information. We convert this to a binary task by subsetting to
classes 1 and 2, which are the most numerous.
Adult and Forest are tabular datasets, while MNIST-binary and
CIFAR2 consist of images. The sizes and dimensionality of these
datasets are given in Table 1. CIFAR, MNIST and Adult have pre-
specified test sets. For Forest we randomly select 15% of examples
to form the test set. We form a validation set by selecting 10% of
the data remaining after removing the test set in all cases. This
validation set is used to select hyperparameters and convergence
point. Final model performance is reported on the test set. Each
dataset is normalised such that | |x| | ≤ 1.
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Covertype
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Model Dataset η T E P Hidden size
LogReg CIFAR2 0.5 2000 20000 51 -
MNIST-binary 0.5 1850 19600 51 -
Adult 0.5 3400 25700 101 -
Forest 1.0 8400 20693 50 -
NN CIFAR2 0.5 2500 20000 521 10
MNIST-binary 0.5 4750 9800 521 10
Adult 0.5 1850 11250 817 8
Forest 0.5 3500 11247 511 10
Table 2: Training and model hyperparameters. η is the fixed
learning rate.T is the number of training steps (we take this
as the convergence point of the model). E is the number of
experiments performed, and P is the number of parameters
in the model. For logistic regressionmodels P = d +1. LogReg
refers to logistic regression models, and NN to neural net-
works.
5.2.2 Models and training. We focus on both convex and non-
convex objectives by considering two model classes:
(1) Logistic regression. Using a standard cross-entropy loss, the
objective function for logistic regression is convex and Lipschitz
with constant L = supx | |x| | and smooth with β = supx∥x∥2.
As we normalize all datasets to | |x| | ≤ 1 and our models have a
bias term, we have L =
√
2 for logistic regression models.
(2) Neural networks. We consider fully-connected neural networks
with one hidden layer, using a relu nonlinearity and a sigmoid
activation on the output. In this case the Lipschitz constant
is unknown and we can’t use theoretical sensitivity bounds,
computing only empirical sensitivity ∆ˆ∗S .
For both model classes, we train with a fixed learning rate5 and
select the convergence point based on the validation performance
failing to improve three times in a row, or by visual assessment of
loss curves (see e.g. Figure 6). Validation performance was com-
puted every 50 or 100 batches. We evaluate at the convergence
point to avoid studying models which overfit. This is important for
both reducing generalisation error, and for preserving privacy as
we do not expect reasonable privacy after overfitting. For logistic
regression we expect models to converge to a neighbourhood of
the unique (data-dependent) minimum of the convex loss rather
than overfit in the typical sense. In this case, we would expect the
sensitivity of SGD to depend purely on the sensitivity of the opti-
mum itself to dataset perturbations. If the size of the neighbourhood
around this optimum (dictated by the fixed learning rate) is too
small (relative to the sensitivity of the optimum), we would expect
privacy loss. Therefore, for both convex and non-convex models
we consider early stopping important. The impact of the choice of
stopping point is explored in Section 7.2.
We performed mild, but not extensive hyperparameter optimisa-
tion as our focus is not on finding the best-performing model. We
used a batch size of 32 for all datasets, except for Forest where
B = 50, to replicate [48]. Resulting hyperparameters of models and
the training algorithm are shown in Table 2. The batch size, learning
5In practice learning rate decay is used to ensure convergence of SGD, however for
simplicity, and to enable use of the theoretical sensitivity bound from [48] we consider
a fixed learning rate.
rate, and convergence point appear in the theoretical sensitivity
bound (Theorem A.1) and we further expect these parameters to
influence the variability of the resulting weight distribution. As we
are focusing on the impact of the random seed however, for the
purpose of this investigation we consider them fixed.
5.2.3 Implementation details. Experiments were implemented
in Keras[8] and TensorFlow[1], with Sacred[17] for experiment
management. Wrangling of results and generation of figures relied
on scikit-learn [37], pandas [30], matplotlib [20], and seaborn [47].
Model parameters were initialised according to the ‘glorot-uniform’
setting in Keras, which is default. Biases were initialised to zero.
Experiments were run on one Tesla P100 and two Tesla K80s on
Azure Data Science Virtual Machines. We plan to make our source
code available publicly.
6 RESULTS
In this section, we report our empirical results across four datasets,
aimed at understanding the data-dependent variability of SGD and
its potential to improve private model performance.We explore how
changes in random seed and perturbations to the dataset manifest in
the resulting model weights (Section 6.1), we estimate the resulting
intrinsic σi (D) and ϵi (D) (Section 6.2), and demonstrate the impact
on utility of accounting for the intrinsic noise σi (D) (Section 6.3).
6.1 Data-dependent variability in SGD
We consider two sources of variability in the learned model: dataset
perturbations, and choice of random seed. We aim to estimate:
(1) Variation due to dataset; ∆S := ∥A(r ; S) −A(r ; S ′)∥
(2) Variation due to seed; ∆V := ∥A(r ; S) −A(r ′; S)∥.
(a) allowing for fixed initialisation (∆fixV )
(b) and seed-dependent initialisation (∆varyV )
(3) Variation in both; ∆S+V := ∥A(r ; S) −A(r ′; S ′)∥
where r and r ′ are two random seeds, S and S ′ are two neighbouring
datasets, and A is the SGD algorithm which outputs a vector of
model weights.We study how the variability due to seed (∆fixV ,∆
vary
V )
compares to the data sensitivity ∆S . We also test the tightness of
the the theoretical bound proposed in [18, 48] (∆ˆS ) for convex
objectives.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of these quantities across experi-
ments for the four datasets and two model classes considered. We
make the following observations:
• In almost all cases, ∆varyV > ∆S , indicating that changing the seed
almost always has a larger impact than perturbing the dataset.
This supports our intuition that choice of random seed has a
larger impact on the resulting model weights than small changes
to the data. Put another way, the variability due to randomness
appears to exceed the algorithmic stability of SGD. The overlap
between ∆S+V and ∆V also indicates that changes in the seed
account for most of the change in the model weights.
• Where available, the theoretical bound ∆ˆS (vertical dashed line)
is quite loose for all datasets, often exceeding the largest observed
value of ∆S by a factor between 3.15 and 6.46. This suggests that
even without accounting for intrinsic noise in SGD, existing
approaches are likely over-estimating the sensitivity of SGD
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Figure 2: Distribution of ∥w −w′∥ across pairs of experiments differing in data (∆S ), random seed (∆fixV ,∆
vary
V ), or both (∆S+V ).
The change in w is dominated by the random seed, as evidenced by ∆V tending to be much larger than ∆S . ∆fixV refers to the
setting where the random seed is variable, but the initialisation of themodel is fixed. The vertical dashed line is the theoretical
upper bound of ∆S proposed by [48] (only available for convex objectives). The first row shows results for logistic regression,
and the second is for a fully-connected neural network with one hidden layer.
(and underestimating its stability), and adding unnecessary noise
for the desired privacy guarantees.
• Allowing the initialisation of the model to depend on the seed
further increases variability due to seed, andwe see∆varyV exceeds
even the theoretical bound ∆ˆS .
• The results are qualitatively the same for logistic regression and
the neural network, however we observe a longer tail in the
distribution of ∆V for neural networks. This indicates that in
a small number of cases, a dataset perturbation can produce a
change in the final model weights comparable to changing the
random seed. Upon investigation, we suspect this behaviour is
caused by situationswhere the differing data point is encountered
near the start of training, a phenomenon also observed by [18].
• Comparing across datasets, we see that the gap between ∆varyV
and ∆fixV is smallest for Forest using logistic regression. We
speculate that this is caused by the larger (fixed) learning rate
used for Forest - even if the model converges quickly to the
vicinity of the uniqueminimum, a larger learning rate extends the
size of this vicinity and subsequently the variability in weights.
For the neural network on Forest, which uses the same learning
rate the other datasets, the gap between ∆varyV and ∆
fix
V no longer
appears to deviate.
6.2 What is the ‘intrinsic’ σi (D) and ϵi (D)?
To estimate the intrinsic σi (D) and ϵi (D) of SGD for each dataset,
we follow the procedures outlined in Section 3 and Algorithm 1,
using the large grid of experiments on the four datasets. We first
obtain an estimate of the sensitivity of SGD for that dataset, using
the theoretical bound ∆ˆS where available, or the empirical sensitiv-
ity estimate ∆ˆ∗S which is simply taken as the max of ∆S as defined
in the previous section. We then estimate the variability due to
seed (σi (D)) using the variable initialisation setting, and combine
with δ = 1/N 2 to obtain ϵi (D) and ϵi (D)∗ using theoretical and
empirical sensitivity estimates respectively.
These values for each dataset and the two model classes are
shown in Table 3. It is clear that σi (D) and ∆ˆ∗S differ across datasets
and models. We further make the following observations:
CIFAR2 MNIST- Adult Forest
binary
δ 1.23x10−8 9.25x10−9 1.16x10−9 6.97x10−12
Logistic regression
∆ˆS 0.314 0.252 0.164 0.063
∆ˆ∗S 0.057 0.059 0.036 0.020
σi (D) 0.083 0.085 0.108 0.114
ϵi (D) 23.10 18.17 9.77 3.95
ϵi (D)∗ 4.19 4.22 2.13 1.25
Neural networks
∆ˆ∗S 4.813 7.688 3.891 3.307
σi (D) 0.4433 0.713 0.288 0.554
ϵi (D)∗ 65.922 66.009 87.136 42.939
Table 3: Theoretical sensitivity (∆ˆS ), empirical sensitivity
(∆ˆ∗S ), privacy parameter δ (1/N 2), intrinsic variability σi (D)
accounting for variable initialisation, intrinsic ϵi (D), and in-
trinsic ϵi (D)∗ computed using the empirical bound. For re-
sults on neural networks (last 3 lines), no theoretical sensi-
tivity bound is available and so only ϵi (D)∗ can be estimated.
• The intrinsic ϵi (D) computed for logistic regression greatly ex-
ceeds the ϵi (D)∗ computed using the empirical bound, reflecting
again the looseness of the theoretical bound. Both of these values
decrease as N increases, despite δ decreasing with 1/N 2. For neu-
ral networks, while Forest still exhibits the lowest ϵi (D)∗, the
same trend is not visible. While σi (D) is relatively similar across
logistic regression models, in the non-convex case it exhibits
more complex dataset dependence.
• σi (D) is much larger for neural networks than logistic regression.
This is likely due to the (potential) presence of multiple minima
in the non-convex setting of the neural networks. For logistic
regression, all models should converge to approximately the
same optimum, and therefore σi (D) relates to distance from
and spread around this optimum. For neural networks, different
seeds may lead to completely different parts of the parameter
7
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Figure 3: Distribution of pairwise intrinsic ϵi (D). A rela-
tively small number of dataset pairs (with fixed seed) con-
tribute a rightward skew to the pairwise ϵi (D) distribution.
We use the distance between the weights of models trained
on pairs of datasets (∆S ) to estimate a ‘local’ sensitivity for
pairwise ϵi (D) calculations.
space, increasing σi (D). Although neural networks have larger
σi (D), the sensitivity ∆ˆ∗S is much larger, resulting in very high
ϵi (D)∗. This is partially driven by the number of parameters in
the model as ∆ˆ∗S is the ℓ2-norm of a vector (and σi (D) is not),
but also depends on the number of training steps. We further
discuss this phenomenon in Section 7.2.
Table 3 highlights that our analysis of SGD necessarily depends
on the underlying dataset, motivating further study into data-
dependent differentially-private mechanisms [27, 32].
6.2.1 ‘Pairwise’ ϵi (D)∗. To further explore the impact of the
dataset, in Figure 3 we show the distribution of ‘pairwise ϵi (D)∗’.
The pairwise ϵi (D)∗ is computed by replacing the global empiri-
cal sensitivity ∆ˆ∗S and variability σi (D) with values estimated off
pairs of adjacent datasets. That is, we use the ‘local’ sensitivity
(∥A(r ; S) −A(r ; S ′)∥; described in Section 3 and comprising the ∆S
curves in Figure 2) and the estimate of σi (D) using only the pair of
adjacent datasets (with all available random seeds). This produces
a distribution of ϵi (D)∗ values - one for each pair of datasets.
We find empirically that our estimate of σi (D) does not greatly
depend on which dataset instance we use (see Section 7.4), so the
pairwise ϵi (D)∗ largely reflects the local sensitivity of the dataset,
and ϵi (D)∗ then approximately corresponds to themaximum across
pairwise ϵi (D)∗. We observe in several cases that ϵi (D)∗ is domi-
nated by a small number of dataset pairs with high pairwise ϵi (D)∗.
This suggests that constraining to a lower-sensitivity subset of the
data space could allow for a lower ϵi (D)∗. This observation aligns
with the idea of dataset-specific smooth sensitivity that is always
lower than the global sensitivity. Our empirical approach of cal-
culating ϵi (D)∗ and the sampling-based approach for computing
smooth-sensitivity of a function (f ) both rely on the assumption
that f can be approximated using publicly available data [32].
6.3 How does accounting for intrinsic
variability improve utility?
We have seen that the intrinsic ϵi (D) of SGD can be quantified,
but in many cases is insufficient alone to provide a desirable level
of privacy. In this section, we demonstrate that by accounting for
ϵi (D) (via σi (D)), model performance can be improved over an
existing approach based solely on output perturbation.
We focus here only on logistic regression. As evidenced by Ta-
ble 3, the neural networks we study do not exhibit practically useful
ϵi (D) values. Adding noise to such high-dimensional models, even
accounting for the tight empirical bound on the sensitivity, and
the enhanced variability due to randomness in the initialisation,
tends to destroy their utility and so we exclude the analysis of
performance here. We leave developing strategies for more realistic
high-capacity models to future work.
To study ‘private’ model performance we apply the procedure
described in Section 4 and Algorithm 2. In essence, we compute the
target σ of the Gaussian mechanism to produce a private model
using output perturbation, and modify it for three scenarios:
(1) Noiseless (σ = 0)
(2) ‘SGD as deterministic’ (SGDd); the setting in [48]. We esti-
mate the requiredσ (σtarget) using the Gaussianmechanism
and the sensitivity ∆ˆS of SGD.
(3) ‘SGD with unknown seed’ (SGDr); thinking of SGD as a
randomised mechanism, we estimate the required σ as
σaugment =
√
σ 2target − σi (D)2
We also include the setting where the sensitivity is computed empir-
ically to determine σtarget, corresponding to the optimistic bound.
For a single trained model, we compare these settings by sam-
pling a standard Gaussian noise vector once, and scaling it according
to the required σ . As the performance of each trained model varies
(even in the noiseless setting), to compare the improvement attribut-
able to treating SGD as random we perform paired t-tests between
the settings for a fixed model. This allows us to detect consistent
improvement even when the underlying noiseless performance
changes. In Table 4, we report the utility for ϵ = 1. We include
ϵ = 0.5 in Appendix Table 7. We use 500 randomly-sampled models
for each dataset to compute these results.
We see that the ‘augmented DP-SGD’ (SGDr) setting produces
a model with consistently and significantly superior utility to one
which does not take intrinsic randomness into account. The mag-
nitude of the improvement - although statistically significant - is
typically quite small, reflecting the relatively large intrinsic ϵi (D)∗.
Accounting for intrinsic privacy nonetheless helps in closing the
gap to the accuracy of a noiseless model by up to 6.46%. Using
the empirical bound ∆ˆS produces a more obvious improvement in
utility, closing the gap between 2.54% and 36.31%, providing further
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CIFAR2 MNIST- Adult Forest
binary
Noiseless 0.788(4) 0.953(1) 0.8340(7) 0.771(2)
∆2(f ) = ∆ˆS
SGDd 0.719(2) 0.853(2) 0.53(1) 0.75(1)
SGDr +.00002 +.0002 +.0020 +.0013
% of gap 0.03% 0.15% 0.66% 6.46%
∆2(f ) = ∆ˆ∗S
SGDd 0.763(4) 0.941(2) 0.810(8) 0.767(6)
SGDr +.0006 +.0007 +.0067 +.0023
% of gap 2.54% 5.25% 36.31% 14.13%
Table 4: We report the (binary) accuracy of private and non-
private (‘gold standard’) models on the four datasets for lo-
gistic regression using ϵ = 1. SGDd is the setting in [48]
where SGD is treated as deterministic and noise is added to
the weights per the Gaussian mechanism. SGDr is the set-
ting we propose, where the intrinsic variability (σi (D)) is
used to decrease themagnitude of added noise. Reported are
averages across 500 trained models, with brackets showing
the standard deviation in the final digit. Bold face indicates
a statistically significant improvement (paired t-test, p-val
< 10−6). The percentage improvement is over the gap be-
tween SGDd and the noiseless performance, indicating how
much ‘missing’ performance in the private model can be re-
gained by accounting for the intrinsic noise.
motivation to tighten the bound on the sensitivity of SGD. Further
work will be required to explore whether SGD can be engineered
to produce increased σi (D) without impacting sensitivity or utility,
allowing for further improvements to private model performance.
7 FURTHER ANALYSES
In this section we augment our main findings of Section 6 with
further analyses. To better understand the impact of data prepro-
cessing we explore three variants of MNIST-binary (Section 7.1),
and investigate how the number of training steps T influences
both sensitivity and variability in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3 we
report results for a convolutional neural network on the full MNIST
dataset. Finally, we explore the validity of our assumptions and
experimental design in Section 7.4.
7.1 Effect of preprocessing dataset
As we have seen, there is variation in the values of σi (D) and
ϵi (D) across datasets. To further explore the data-dependence of
our findings, we performed variants of the experiment within a
dataset (MNIST-binary), where we apply different dimensionality
reduction methods before applying the logistic regression model:
(1) (PCA) Principal component analysis, as in [2], to d = 50
(2) (GRP) Gaussian random projections, as in [48], to d = 50
(3) (Crop) Cropping to the 10 × 10 central square of the image
and flattening (d = 100)
In all cases, we still scale | |x| | ≤ 1.
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Figure 4: Distribu-
tion of feature values
in three variants
of MNIST-binary us-
ing either PCA pre-
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random projections
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nary cross-entropy) and
accuracy as a function
of training steps for
the three preprocess-
ing approaches tested
on MNIST-binary. The
selected convergence
point (T = 1850) is
indicated by a vertical
dashed line.
Figure 4 shows how this preprocessing changes the underlying
dataset statistics. For Crop, the data remains sparse ( 46% of feature
values are zero), while PCA and GRP produce dense symmetrical
distributions with differing levels of kurtosis.
In Figure 5 we show the training curves aggregated across ex-
periments from each of these settings using the fixed learning rate
of η = 0.5. We also tested other learning rates, but they did not
strongly impact the findings and so for simplicity we fix η across
the experiments. As we see, PCA converges more quickly to a better-
performing model, so we used this setting in all other analyses on
MNIST-binary.
For simplicity, we compare all settings at t = 1850 steps (this
is the convergence point selected for PCA used elsewhere in the
paper). In Table 5 we compare the empirical sensitivity, σi (D),
and resulting ‘intrinsic ϵi (D)’ for the three settings, as well as the
noiseless performance of the three models (which can also be seen
in Figure 5). In all cases, δ = 1/N 2. Since the learning rate, Lipschitz
constant, and number of iterations is the same for all settings, the
theoretical bound ∆ˆS is identical.
We see the largest utility improvement from augmented SGD for
the Crop setting, owing to its low ϵi (D) value driven by a relatively
higher σi (D) and lower ∆ˆ∗S . However, as the base performance of
this model is worse, the resulting private model remains inferior
to PCA. This suggests that a practitioner should focus on obtaining
the highest-performing model rather than attempting to optimise
for σi (D). However, presence of the variability suggests that modi-
fications to the data distribution can influence σi (D), and further
investigation will be required to characterise this relationship.
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PCA GRP Crop
# experiments 19600 14796 5000
Accuracy (noiseless) 0.953(1) 0.907(2) 0.917(1)
SGDd (ϵ = 1) 0.941(2) 0.900(4) 0.908(2)
SGDr (ϵ = 1) +0.0007 +0.0006 +0.0011
∆ˆS 0.2523 0.2523 0.2523
∆ˆ∗S 0.0586 0.0473 0.0448
σi (D) 0.0850 0.0989 0.1152
ϵi (D) 18.17 15.61 13.41
ϵi (D)∗ 4.22 2.92 2.38
Table 5: Comparison of the accuracy, empirical sensitiv-
ity (∆ˆ∗S , intrinsic variability (σi (D)) and intrinsic ϵi (D) and
ϵi (D)∗ for the MNIST-binary variants on logistic regression.
The theoretical sensitivity ∆ˆS is identical. We use the empir-
ical sensitivity bound to produce themodels SGDd and SGDr,
following Algorithm 2 in the latter case.
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Figure 6: We show how empirical sensitivity and intrinsic
variability (both with and without a fixed initial model) de-
pend on the number of training steps. Results shown are
for MNIST-binary for both logistic regression and neural net-
works. Appendix B.2 shows results on the other datasets,
but they are qualitatively the same. The theoretical sensitiv-
ity exhibits a stepwise increase as it increments per epoch.
For the neural network, we only report empirical sensitivity.
‘fixed init’ and ‘variable init’ indicate whether the initialisa-
tion of themodel was fixed, or allowed to varywith the seed.
7.2 Dependence on training time
As highlighted by [29], training ‘faster’ (i.e. converging earlier)
produces superior generalisation through smaller sensitivity. This
is reflected by the linear dependence on the number of training steps
on the theoretical bound ∆ˆS . However, the relationship between
the empirical sensitivity, as well as the intrinsic variability, and the
number of training steps is not known. We use our experimental
set-up to explore this dependence.
In Figure 6 we plot ∆ˆS (if available), estimated ∆ˆ∗S , and σi (D)
against the number of training steps T , for CIFAR2 and the two
model classes. Results on the other datasets are included in Appen-
dix Section B.2, but are qualitatively similar.
We can make the following observations:
• For logistic regression, empirical sensitivity ∆ˆ∗S grows with T ,
but with a slope much lower than predicted by theory, reflecting
again that the theoretical bound is not tight. On neural networks,
similarly ∆ˆ∗S grows with T . This reflects the tendency towards
overfitting, and would likely be mitigated with weight decay.
• The behaviour of σi (D) for convex models reflects convergence
towards the unique minimum of the objective - given random
initialisation, σi (D) is initially large. It then decays as models
‘forget’ their initialisations and converge towards the minimum.
Conversely, with a fixed initialisation the cross-model variability
is low, and eventually converges to a steady value corresponding
to oscillation around the optimum, with magnitude influenced
by the learning rate.
• For the neural networks, we instead see that σi (D) tends to
increase over time regardless of initialisation, indicating that
models are converging to increasingly distant locations in pa-
rameter space.
Overall we see that there is a tension between ∆ˆ∗S and σi (D) for
selecting T - for neural networks a large value of T would provide
large σi (D), but as ∆ˆ∗S grows more rapidly, the settings we examine
would be better served selecting a lower T .
7.3 Multi-class classification
To check if our findings so far are specific to binary classification
or ‘simple’ models, we additionally explore a convolutional neural
network (CNN) on the full 10-class classification problem of MNIST.
In this case, we keep the training examples in their original (28×28)
shape and do not enforce ∥x∥ ≤ 1, simply scaling pixel values by
255. As we consider all 10 classes, we use the original dataset with
10000 test examples and 60000 training examples. From these 60000
we use 6000 as the validation set and the remaining 54000 to train
the model.
For the CNNwe attempt replicate the cuda-convnetmodel used
in [18]. This is a CNNwith three convolutional layers each followed
by a (max) pooling operation, and no dropout. Each convolutional
layer uses 8 filters, and the kernel sizes are (3× 3), (2× 2) and (2× 2)
respectively. The pool sizes are all (2 × 2). The output of the final
pool is flattened and fed to a fully connected layer mapping it to
a hidden size of 10 with relu nonlinearity, which is then mapped
to a 10-dimensional softmax output to perform classification. The
resulting model has 1448 parameters, and we run 3200 experiments
testing a grid of 40 dataset instances and 40 random seeds with
fixed and variable model initialisation.
Using a batch size of 32 and a learning rate of 0.1, this architecture
achieves an accuracy of 93± 2% after 1000 training steps, which we
take as the convergence point.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of ∆S and ∆V for this setting.
We see a similar story to results on other neural networks (second
row of Figure 2) suggesting there is nothing unique about fully-
connected feed-forward networks not shared by CNNs here. The
interesting difference is the sharpness of the ∆varyV distribution. It
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Figure 7: Distribution of differences in model weights from
pairs of experiments, for a CNN on MNIST. For each experi-
ment pair, we vary the dataset (∆S ), the random seed (∆V ),
or both (∆S+V ). While varying the random seed, the initial-
isation of the model is either fixed (∆fixV ) or varies with the
seed (∆varyV ).
is virtually identical to what would result from taking pairwise
distances between random Gaussian vectors of the same dimension
and scale as the learned CNN weights, suggesting a multitude of
minima and no obvious ‘clustering’ of models.
7.4 Empirical validity of findings
Here we test the validity of assumptions and the consistency of the
estimates produced by our empirical analysis.
7.4.1 Is the noise in SGD Gaussian? In designing Algorithm 1,
we assumed that the noise in the weights of SGD follows a normal
distribution with diagonal covariance. In this section we test the
assumption that the marginals of the weight distribution are nor-
mally distributed, that is that wa ∼ N(µa ,σ 2a ) for each a. This is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the joint to be normal,
and thus a weaker assumption. We compare the marginals ofwa by
conducting a the Shapiro-Wilk statistical test of normality [39]. The
distribution of resulting p-values of this test are shown in Figure 8,
which aggregates over weights and using multiple dataset variants.
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Figure 8: The marginal distribution of most model parame-
ters is consistent with a normal distribution, shown by the
distribution of p-values from Shapiro-Wilk [39] test of nor-
mality. The density is over each parameter from eachmodel
across 50 experiments. Vertical lines indicate the ‘standard’
p = 0.05 cutoff, as well as thresholds corrected for multi-
ple hypothesis testing, using the Bonferroni correction p =
0.05/M , where M is the number of hypotheses, in our case
this is the number of model parameters times the number
of experiments, soM = 50P .
101 102 103
number of dataset comparisons
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
es
tim
at
ed
 se
ns
iti
vi
ty
MNIST-binary (logistic regression)
0 20 40 60 80
number of random seeds
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
es
tim
at
ed
 
i(
)
MNIST-binary (logistic regression)
Figure 9: We show how increasing the number of experi-
ments used impact the estimates of empirical sensitivity ∆ˆ∗S
(left) and variability σi (D) (right). Dashed horizontal lines
show the values of ∆ˆ∗S and σi (D) used across results in this
paper.
Small p-values indicate the hypothesis that the distribution is
normal can be rejected. The thresholds for rejection are marked by
two vertical lines - the line at p = 0.05 reflects a standard threshold
for such a statistical test, however as we are performing many tests
we also indicate the corrected threshold at p = 0.05/(Pnm ) (Bonfer-
roni correction, using the number of parameters (P ) and the number
of models whose weights we examined (nm )). This correction is
applied to avoid spurious rejections of the null hypothesis while
performing multiple tests. As we can see, the majority of weights
would not be rejected at p = 0.05, and very few would be rejected
at the corrected threshold. This indicates that the distribution of
most weights is marginally consistent with a normal distribution.
In the event that a weight is not normally distributed, this rules
out the possibility of the joint distribution being multivariate nor-
mal. In such cases, our assumption that the posterior of SGD is
normal is violated. In theory, the probability the these underlying
assumptions are violated could be incorporated into δ , resulting in
probabilistic differential privacy [31]. We leave this accounting to
future work, and here retain the caveat that our empirical results
do not constitute a privacy guarantee for SGD in any case, as our
assumptions are overly strong in practice.
7.4.2 Did we run enough experiments? We have explored only a
subset of the possible combinations of dataset perturbations and
random seeds for each of our data sources, which may introduce un-
certainty in our estimates of ∆ˆ∗S and σi (D). To test this, in Figure 9
we visualise how the estimates of ∆ˆ∗S and σi (D) change as we use
more data (that is, include more experiments) for MNIST-binary.
Other models and datasets are included in Appendix B.3.
As we can see, as the number of experiments used to estimate
the values increases, our estimates tend towards a fixed value, sug-
gesting that more experiments would not substantially alter the
findings. We see that we are likely under-estimating the sensitiv-
ity (∆ˆ∗S ) slightly, which is a natural consequence of it being the
maximum of an unknown distribution.
In Table 6 we demonstrate that the value of σi (D) does not de-
pend strongly on the dataset instance used to estimate it. Combined
with the observation that the σi (D) estimate appears to converge
after approximately 40 seeds (this is true across all our datasets and
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CIFAR2 MNIST-binary Adult Forest
Logistic regression
# datasets 100 100 75 75
min 0.08267214 0.0849974 0.10835 0.11426
max 0.08267215 0.0849979 0.10836 0.11428
Neural networks
# datasets 100 50 75 75
min 0.44331 0.71272 0.28796 0.5544
max 0.44339 0.71273 0.28797 0.5545
Table 6: The estimate of σi (D) is highly stable across dataset
instances {Si } for both logistic regression and neural net-
works across all four datasets. We report the minimum and
maximum observed variability estimated from each dataset
instance across many dataset instances, retaining digits un-
til the first difference.
models), it appears that running more pairwise experiment compar-
isons becomes important to better estimate ∆ˆ∗S , whose estimates
are less stable.
8 RELATEDWORK
Stability of SGD. The results in this paper build from a line of
work examining the algorithmic stability of SGD, which is closely
related to sensitivity as used in differential privacy. Bousquet and
Elisseeff [5] first defined the notion of algorithmic stability for a
learning algorithm such as SGD and related it to generalisation
error. Hardt et al. [18] expanded these results, relating them to
modern deep learning techniques and hyperparameters of SGD;
Kuzborskij and Lampert [27] extend the analysis to data-dependent
stability and generalisation bounds. In these cases, and in much
work studying SGD, the focus is on understanding the generalisa-
tion properties of the algorithm. While the links between stability,
privacy, and generalisation have already been established [5, 18, 33],
to our knowledge this is the first work to directly explore the in-
trinsic privacy-preserving properties of SGD.
SGD as a randomised mechanism. Our argument that SGD can
be viewed as an instance of the Gaussian mechanism casts SGD as a
sampling procedure from some posterior distribution over weights.
Following prior work viewing SGD as a stochastic differential equa-
tion [43], Mandt et al. [29] characterise this posterior as the solution
to the SDE, which happens to be Gaussian. This allows SGD to be
interpreted as equivalent to performing approximate Bayesian in-
ference for a particular choice of variational distribution. However,
the Gaussian assumption for the gradient noise continues to be
studied [22, 34, 42], and to our knowledge there does not yet exist
a general theory of the posterior distribution for SGD. Dieuleveut
et al. [10] view SGD with constant step size as a homogeneous
Markov chain that converges to a stationary distribution for convex
case, but they do not characterise the resulting distribution.
Differentially-private machine learning. Much ongoing research
aims to develop differentially-private variants of training algo-
rithms, including objective perturbation [7], gradient perturba-
tion [2], and teacher-student frameworks [35, 36]. These methods
typically provide privacy throughout training, assuming a differ-
ent threat model to our setting. We focus on output perturbation,
which is addressed byWu et al. [48]. They treat SGD as a ‘black box’
and inject Laplace or Gaussian noise on the final model weights.
The augmented differentially-private SGD algorithm in this paper
builds on this black-box approach by reducing the amount of noise
required for a given level of privacy. Our approach of computing
empirical sensitivity ϵi (D) can be combined with other techniques
of calculating data-dependent sensitivity such as smooth sensitivity,
thereby improving overall utility guarantees [32].
9 CONCLUSION
Wehave taken the first steps towards examining the data-dependent
inherent randomness in SGD from a privacy perspective. Using a
large-scale experimental study we have quantified the variability
of SGD due to random seed and related this to its data-dependent
sensitivity and the notion of an ‘intrinsic ϵi (D)’ in the sense of
differential privacy. These findings demonstrate that the choice of
random seed has a strictly greater impact on the resulting weights
of the model than perturbations in the data for both convex and
non-convex models considered.
By accounting for this variability, statistically significant perfor-
mance improvements can be achieved for low-dimensional models.
That is to say, the intrinsic noise in SGD does not appear to be
trivial in the sense of utility, across the four datasets we considered.
We have further demonstrated that existing theoretical bounds on
the data-dependent sensitivity of SGD on convex objectives are
loose, and using optimistic empirical ‘bounds’, private model per-
formance can be greatly improved. While we performed similar
analyses across both convex and non-convex objectives, for higher-
dimensional neural networks, the noise required for private output
perturbation degrades performance substantially.
Our results also highlight the data-dependence of both the vari-
ability and sensitivity of SGD. This supports theory on the data-
dependent stability of SGD [27] and also demonstrates that data-
independent sensitivity bounds for convex objectives are loose.
In our analysis and experiments, we have focused on SGD with
fixed learning rate and batch size, and without modifications such
as momentum or variants like Adam or RMSprop [25, 45]. We spec-
ulate that these hyperparameters can also be exploited for privacy,
either by keeping them as private information, or by selecting
them to maximise the variability of SGD relative to its sensitivity.
Characterising the nature of these relationships and potential for
engineering SGD variants with increased (non-harmful) variability
will require further study.
As the stochasticity of SGD has been explored for its generalisa-
tion properties, we hope this work inspires further work into the
deep connections between privacy and generalisation, suggesting a
new angle for viewing the privacy vs. utility trade-off in the design
of differentially private learning algorithms.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Sensitivity of SGD for convex functions
Assumptions. Let W ⊆ Rp be the hypothesis space, and L :
W 7→ R the loss function. We assume that ∀u,v ∈ W:
• L is convex; i.e., L(u) ≥ L(v) + ⟨∇(v),u −v⟩
• L is L-Lipschitz i.e., ∥L(u) − L(v)∥ ≤ L∥u −v ∥
• L is β-smooth; i.e., ∥∇L(u) − ∇L(v)∥ ≤ β ∥u −v ∥
We present the results for the sensitivity of SGD due to a change
input datapoint as provided by Wu et al. [48]:
Theorem A.1. From [48]. Let A denote the SGD algorithm using
r as the random seed then the upper bound for sensitivity for k-passes
of SGD is given by, ∆ˆS = maxr ∥A(r ; S) −A(r ; S ′)∥ ≤ 2kLη
Here, ∆ˆS gives the maximum difference in the model parameters
due to the presence or absence of a single input sample. Their
results rely on the boundedness and expansiveness properties for the
gradient update rule (G) of SGD as proposed by Hardt et al. [18]:
Property 1. (Boundedness of G.) For a loss function that is
L-Lipschitz and learning rate η, the gradient update of SGD is ηL
bounded i.e., supw ∈W ∥G(w) −w ∥ ≤ ηL
Property 2. (Expansiveness of G.) For a loss function that is β-
smooth, and η ≤ 2/β , then the gradient update of SGD is 1-expansive
i.e., supw,w ′
∥G(w )−G(w ′) ∥
∥w−w ′ ∥ ≤ 1
As this is not the main contribution of our paper, we refer in-
terested readers to the original paper for a formal proof [48]. We
provide here a brief intuition for achieving the bound: For a single
pass of SGD over neighbouring datasets S and S ′ with a fixed ini-
tialization and fixed sampling strategy, the two executions G and
G ′ will differ only at a single step — when the differing sample
gets selected. In that case, from the above boundedness property,
we have that G(w) − G ′(w ′) ≤ 2Lη. For all the other steps, the
samples selected are exactly same and hence the 1-expansiveness
property applies. Therefore, after k-passes of SGD over the dataset,
the difference in the model parameters will have an upper bound
of 2kLη. When trained using a batchsize of B, the sensitivity bound
can be reduced by a factor of B i.e., ∆ˆS ≤ 2kLη/B. Henceforth, the
theoretical sensitivity always refers to the one with batchsize B.
A.2 Upper bound on variability due to the
randomness in SGD
We use the boundedness and expansivity properties of the gradient
update rule to calculate the upper bound for the variability in SGD.
Here, we focus only on the difference in model parameters due
to the stochastic process of selecting samples during training -
including the variability in model initialisation will only increase
the variability, as the difference between model weights at time
T = 0 is non-zero.
We use a similar argument as in prior work for calculating the
bound at each step of SGD. For a single pass of SGD on dataset
S with fixed initialization but different random seeds r and r ′ for
sampling inputs, in the ‘best’ case, every step encounters different
samples. Thus, by boundedness, each step will add at most a 2Lη
deviation between the model parameters. Therefore, after k passes
of SGD through a dataset of size N where each step selects differing
samples, we get a variability bound of:
∆ˆV = max
r,r ′
∥A(r ; S) −A(r ′; S ′)∥ ≤ 2kLNη. (6)
Claim 1. The upper bound of variability due to the randomness in
SGD is strictly greater than of the sensitivity of SGD due to the change
in a single input sample i.e., ∆ˆV > ∆ˆS
The above claim gives a weak guarantee about the inherent
noise in SGD as it considers the upper bound of the variability. This
assumed a ‘worst’ (or best)-case scenario where different batches
are sampled at every step, comparing between two runs of the
experiment. In reality, there is a chance for two runs of SGD to
sample the same example at the same point during training. To
tighten the bound on ∆ˆV , we can try to account for this distribution
over permutations. We consider the upper bound of ∆ˆV (which is at
most 2kLNη) to be a random variable itself, and use the Chebyshev
inequality to demonstrate that it is usually larger than the sensitivity
(see Section A.2.1 for proof):
Claim 2. The bound on the variability of SGD is larger than its
sensitivity with high probability.
P
[ |∆ˆV − E[∆ˆV ]| ≥ kLη(N − 2)] ≤ 4
k(N − 2)2
Since N is typically large, we see that the probability ∆ˆV is
sufficiently far from its mean and near ∆ˆS is very low.
These results cannot conclusively affirm the privacy-preserving
properties of SGD as they pertain only to upper bounds. The lower
bound is likely zero in general due to collapsed variability after
overfitting (or converging to a unique minimum). Determining
when the lower bound is nontrivial remains an open research ques-
tion, however our empirical results indicate that the lower bound
also tends to exceed the data-dependent sensitivity (discussed in
Section 6.1).
A.2.1 Proof of Claim 2. For Claim 2, we need the expected value
and variance of ∆ˆV . The bounds stated previously rely on the fact
that every iteration of SGD with mis-matching samples introduce a
term of 2Lη to the (maximum) difference in outputs. For the upper
bound, we assumed that every sample is mis-matching, that is we
compare runs of SGD where one is a perfect derangement of the
training-set traversal order of the other. In reality, between two runs
with different random seeds, the same example may be encountered
at the same time-point; this would constitute a permutation of the
training data with a fixed point. If we assume that Xi is the number
of fixed points of the training data in epoch i (relative to a fixed
reference permutation), the number of mis-matches is therefore
N − Xi , and the bound on the difference of weights is
∆ˆV =
k∑
i
2Lη(N − Xi ). (7)
The probability distribution of Xi is
P(Xi = j) =
DN , j
N ! , (8)
where N is the number of training examples, and DN , j is a rencon-
tres number giving the number of permutations of length N with j
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fixed points. For large N , the distribution of rencontres numbers
approaches a Poisson distribution with rate parameter λ = 1[6],
and so both the expected value and variance ofXi are 1: This allows
us to use standard properties of expectation and variance, and the
fact that the permutation (and thus Xi ) selected at each epoch is
independent.
E[∆ˆV ] =
k∑
i
2Lη(N − E[Xi ]) = 2kLη(N − 1) (9)
V[∆ˆV ] =
k∑
i
V[2Lη(N − Xi )] = (2Lη)2k (10)
We then use the Chebyshev inequality to bound the probability
that ∆ˆV is far from its mean E[∆ˆV ]. Doing so is interesting because
we can prove that ∆ˆV is unlikely to be near ∆ˆS . If we define t =
|E[∆ˆV ] − ∆ˆS |/2 = kLη(N − 2) then by Chebyshev inequality:
Claim 2. The bound on the variability of SGD is larger than its
sensitivity with high probability.
P
[ |∆ˆV − E[∆ˆV ]| ≥ kLη(N − 2)] ≤ 4
k(N − 2)2
B ADDITIONAL RESULTS
B.1 Utility at ϵ = 0.5
Table 7 replicates Table 4, using ϵ = 0.5. In this more restrictive
privacy setting, we see a more obvious degradation in model per-
formance, and gains from the intrinsic noise are more slight. The
largest gains tend to be made when the private model is relatively
close in performance to the noiseless setting, as any reduction in
the added noise has proportionally a greater effect.
B.2 Dependence on number of training steps
for other datasets
Figure 10 replicates Figure 6 for the other three datasets. We see a
qualitatively similar story - logistic regression models (first row)
approach a fixed σi (D) owing to their convergence to the neigh-
bourhood of the unique minimum. The empirical sensitivity of the
logistic regression models either increases very slowly or appears
approximately constant (Forest), which may reflect the underlying
sensitivity of the optimum. Conversely, for the neural networks we
see a steadily increasing empirical sensitivity, which may reflect
the tendency for the norm of the model weights to increase during
training.
B.3 Consistency of estimates for other datasets
Figure 11 replicates Figure 11 for neural networks including the
multi-class CNN (from Section 7.3), and the remaining datasets. We
see broadly the same trend - the estimate of σi (D) tends to ‘con-
verge’ after approximately 40 seeds, while the sensitivity estimate
(note the log scale on the x-axis) is less stable. This is likely because
σi (D) appears to be largely unaffected by the dataset instance (See
Table 6) and so only depends on the number of seeds, while the sen-
sitivity is influenced by both seed and the pair of dataset instances
(see Equation 3).
CIFAR2 MNIST- Adult Forest
binary
∆2(f ) = ∆ˆS
SGDd 0.691(2) 0.789(3) 0.277(3) 0.71(1)
SGDr +.00001 +.00002 +.0001 +.0005
% of gap 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 0.82%
∆2(f ) = ∆ˆ∗S
SGDd 0.752(3) 0.912(2) 0.75(1) 0.759(8)
SGDr +.0002 +.0004 +.0038 +.0015
% of gap 0.43% 0.98% 4.70% 7.17%
Table 7: We report the (binary) accuracy of private and non-
private (‘gold standard’) models on the four datasets for lo-
gistic regression using ϵ = 0.5. SGDd is the setting in [48]
where SGD is treated as deterministic and noise is added to
the weights per the Gaussian mechanism. SGDr is the set-
ting we propose, where the intrinsic variability (σi (D)) is
used to decrease themagnitude of added noise. Reported are
averages across 500 trained models, with brackets showing
the standard deviation in the final digit. Bold face indicates
a statistically significant improvement (paired t-test, p-val
< 10−6). The percentage improvement is over the gap be-
tween SGDd and the noiseless performance, indicating how
much ‘missing’ performance in the private model can be re-
gained by accounting for the intrinsic noise. For Adult using
the theoretical bound, the accuracy (highlighted in italics) is
equivalent to the positive label prevalence, so all utility has
been lost.
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Figure 10: Results on the relationship between sensitivity, seed-dependent variability σi (D), and steps of SGD T , for the re-
maining three datasets. As before, σi (D) tends to increase withT for neural networks, while σi (D) either decays or rises to an
approximately constant value for logistic regression.
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Figure 11: Demonstration of how the estimated values of ∆ˆ∗S and σi (D) depend on the number of experiments used for esti-
mation, for all datasets and models not included in Figure 9. These results indicate that although we have only run a small
fraction of the possible experiments, we would not expect our estimates to change greatly with more experiments. Note that
the x-axis for sensitivity estimates (in gold) is using a log scale. Horizontal dashed lines indicate the values for ∆ˆ∗S and σi (D)
used for analyses throughout the paper.
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